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More or Less Bunk: The Establishment Clause
Answers That History Doesn’t Provide
Steven G. Gey ∗
The jurisprudence of the First Amendment’s religion clauses is
one of the most history-laden of any area of constitutional law. From
the beginning of the modern era in the Court’s church-state
jurisprudence, nearly every discussion of note regarding the meaning
of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses has revolved around
the country’s religious history.
When the Supreme Court first announced that the Establishment
Clause was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause and therefore applicable to the states, much of the
Court’s discussion concerned religious discrimination in the early
colonies and the fight over religious establishments more than a
century and a half earlier in Virginia.1 When the Court upheld the
constitutionality of legislative prayers several decades later, it did so
largely on the ground that Congress had itself hired a chaplain nearly
two centuries earlier.2 When Justice Thomas recently argued in favor
of government funding of religious schools, he relied on the
“shameful pedigree” of anti-Catholic discrimination during the
nineteenth century.3 Members of the Court even argue about
whether the views of particular historical figures deserve recognition
∗ David and Deborah Fonvielle and Donald and Janet Hinkle Professor of Law,
Florida State University College of Law. J.D., 1982, Columbia University; B.A., 1978, Eckerd
College.
1. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1947); id. at 31–42 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
2. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Chief Justice Burger observed:
It can hardly be thought that in the same week Members of the First
Congress voted to appoint and to pay a chaplain for each House and also
voted to approve the draft of the First Amendment for submission to the
states, they intended the Establishment Clause of the Amendment to
forbid what they had just declared acceptable.
Id. at 790.
3. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828–29 (2000).
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in debates about the Constitution’s original meaning. Although the
Court has long based its interpretation of the religion clauses on the
views of Thomas Jefferson, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist has
argued that Jefferson’s views "are less than [an] ideal source of
contemporary history" of the Establishment Clause because at the
time the First Amendment was written Jefferson was in France.4
The problem is not that any of these historical discussions are
inaccurate or entirely irrelevant to the discussion of the meaning of
the religion clauses. The problem, rather, is that these discussions are
so selective and tendentiously one-sided that they contribute little to
a reasonable understanding of the modern theory of the First
Amendment. Consider the other side of the four historical
discussions mentioned in the previous paragraph. Although in its
first major examination of the Establishment Clause the Court
correctly noted that James Madison and other opponents defeated
Governor Patrick Henry’s Bill for Religious Assessments, for
example, the Court neglected to mention that other states such as
Massachusetts would continue to finance religious exercises well into
the next century.5 Likewise, although the first Congress indeed paid
for legislative chaplains, the author of the First Amendment himself
would later write that this action directly contravened the
Establishment Clause.6 As for Justice Thomas’s citation to antiCatholic discrimination as the impetus for resistance to government
financing of religion, he failed to note the abundant evidence of
nondiscriminatory opposition to such financing—including the
evidence amassed during the Court’s earlier foray into the history of
the battle over religious assessments in Virginia.7 Finally, the illogic
4. Compare Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (identifying Jefferson
as "an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the measure [i.e., the First Amendment]" and
noting that his views "may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and
effect of the amendment thus secured"), with Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that Jefferson was in France at the time Congress passed the
First Amendment and concluding that “[h]e would seem to any detached observer as a less
than ideal source of contemporary history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment”).
5. See Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the
Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1458.
6. James Madison, untitled manuscript, reprinted in Elizabeth Fleet, Madison’s
“Detached Memoranda,” 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 558–62 (1946).
7. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8–13 (1947); id. at 31–42 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
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of Justice Rehnquist’s attempt to banish from discussions of churchstate relations the author of the Virginia Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom speaks for itself. Jefferson’s views on the First
Amendment may not be, as Chief Justice Waite once asserted,
“authoritative,”8 but they clearly contribute a great deal to the
interpretive matrix in which the meaning of the First Amendment
must be defined.
The frequent use—and misuse—of history in current discussions
of religion-clause doctrine comes to mind in reading Carl Esbeck’s
contribution to this conference on the church-state settlement in the
early American republic.9 Professor Esbeck provides an excellent
survey of the various approaches to the church-state relationship
throughout the early republic and mostly avoids the historical
selectiveness of many other judicial opinions and academic articles on
the subject. His article provides the full flavor of the rich diversity
evident in early American religious and political culture.
My main cavil regarding Professor Esbeck’s account concerns a
few of the lessons he attempts to draw from this history. In
particular, this Comment contests two central themes of Professor
Esbeck’s account. First, I believe Professor Esbeck is wrong to
suggest that history provides any definitive answers to the various
issues raised by the Establishment Clause. As Professor Esbeck’s own
historical evidence indicates, the history of religion in this country is
a complicated and even contradictory affair. Second, to the extent
that historical evidence supports any theory of the Establishment
Clause, it certainly does not support Professor Esbeck’s conclusion
that the Establishment Clause permits the government to derive
public policies directly from religious principles and justifications.
The only historical evidence that supports such an interpretation of
the Establishment Clause involves instances of overt political
favoritism of Protestant Christianity—the sort of historical tendency
that one hopes this much more religiously diverse country has now
moved beyond. After sketching the themes that can be drawn from
Professor Esbeck’s discussion of early American religious history, I

8. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (writing that Jefferson’s views
are “accepted almost as an authoritative declaration”).
9. Esbeck, supra note 5.
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will turn to the lessons these themes suggest for modern
Establishment Clause doctrine.
I. THE THEMES OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN HISTORY
Professor Esbeck’s rendition of the history of religion in America
provides a good example of the difficulties posed by attempts to
define present doctrine by reference to past practices. In short, there
is no one history of religion in America. There are actually multiple
histories, each of which would support a somewhat different
interpretation of the proper constitutional relationship between
religion and government. Ascribing a current meaning to the
Constitution’s religion clauses requires choosing among the various
alternative (and often conflicting) historical models of church-state
relations.
Consider just two of the conflicting currents of history in the
evidence assembled by Professor Esbeck. First, consider the very
different ways in which the original states dealt with the problem of
religious establishments. As Professor Esbeck notes, it is common
practice to cluster the original states into three groups: the New
England states, whose political regimes based on Puritan
establishments lasted well into the nineteenth century in states like
Massachusetts; the middle states, which tended to have weak
religious establishments or none at all; and the southern states,
which started out with Anglican establishments but soon pursued
disestablishment to accommodate both the surge of Protestant
dissenters and the hostility toward an Anglican church that was
closely associated with the former colonial ruler.10 What is one to
make of this history? A consistent theme is hard to derive, except
insofar as it is clear that the trend throughout the country was away
from religious establishments.11 Even Massachusetts abandoned its
10. Id. at 1457–59.
11. One response to the assertion that there is no clear trend in the states is to fall back
on the federalism interpretation of the First Amendment, which asserts that the First
Amendment was little more than a limitation on the federal government’s ability to interfere
with the various states’ approaches to church-state relations. See, e.g., id. at 1576. There are
several problems with this response. First, it rests on the controversial premise that the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment did not federalize rights by applying the principles of
the Bill of Rights to the states. Whatever meager merits this approach may have in the abstract,
it does nothing to help define the scope of the First Amendment in the context of the modern
constitutional universe. For better or worse, it is long settled that the First Amendment has
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Puritan establishment before the new country had existed more than
a few decades.12 But it is unquestionably true that the different
sectors of the country exhibited very different attitudes toward
institutional religion and its direct influence over public policy.
The second set of conflicting currents running through American
religious history reinforces the first. This is the tendency of religious
fervor to rise and fall during different historical periods. Professor
Esbeck details how the First and Second Great Awakenings were split
by a period of relatively muted religious feelings in the period
leading up to the American Revolution.13 The American Revolution
occurred during this interregnum. At the time of the Revolution,
religious feelings were not the primary concern of the American
political or social culture. It is true that during the Awakenings
religion came more to the fore, but even then religious Americans
were often indifferent. As Professor Esbeck points out, “few
Americans formally joined a church (though they still attended
regularly), and fewer still took part in the sacrament of

been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and is therefore applicable to state and
local government action. E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The First
Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the
legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.”). But see Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2328 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing that “the Establishment Clause is a federalism provision, which, for this reason, resists
incorporation”).
Second, even if one accepts the modern application of the federalism interpretation of
the First Amendment, it is by no means clear that the states ratifying the First Amendment
intended by their vote to embrace the legitimacy of overt religious establishments such as those
found in the New England states at the time. Certainly it would be difficult to conceive of any
such endorsement from states such as Rhode Island and Pennsylvania, which never had
religious establishments and strongly resisted religious interference with state affairs. See
Esbeck, supra note 5, at 1414. Using the policies of the proestablishment states to give
meaning to the modern Establishment Clause is especially problematic given the fact that three
of the seven states that continued to maintain some form of formal religious establishment in
1791—Connecticut, Georgia, and Massachusetts—did not even ratify the Bill of Rights until
the twentieth century. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, reprinted in 1 U.S.C. at lxii n.12 (2000)
(listing ratification dates).
12. Esbeck, supra note 5, at 1524.
13. Id. at 1451 (“Between the two Awakenings there was an interruption in church
growth and a pause in interest in spiritual matters. This was caused, in part, by preoccupation
with the Revolutionary War . . . .”).
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communion.”14 When the often lackadaisical religious allegiance of
much of the population is coupled with the influence of rationalists
like Ethan Allen and Thomas Paine, and Deists like James Madison
and Thomas Jefferson, the religious picture of the United States at
its founding appears much more complicated than that of an
overwhelmingly devout polity concerned with preserving the cultural
influence of religion in general and religious organizations in
particular. This more complicated atmosphere casts doubt on
Professor Esbeck’s argument that principles requiring “a socially or
juridically enforced separation of religious values from public
affairs . . . [have] no antecedent in the early American republic.”15
Amidst these inconsistent and even contradictory elements
defining the American religious atmosphere leading up to and
immediately following the founding, there are a few uniform themes
that one may say define the church-state landscape in the early
republic. Two themes that appear throughout Professor Esbeck’s
account strongly support the liberal protection of religious liberty. A
third theme, however, tends to contradict assumptions about
widespread public support for any such protection.
The first liberal theme is the steady growth of voluntarism,
individualism, and religious privatism in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries—to the point that by the beginning of the
nineteenth century this characteristic had become a defining feature
of the American religious experience. Professor Esbeck chronicles
how even the traditionally hierarchical and structurally rigid churches
had to adapt to this quintessentially American approach to religious
faith and practice.16 The Anglican Church reconstituted itself after
the Revolution, significantly loosening its ties with the mother
church in England and strengthening the laity’s control over local
officials and governing structures.17 Similar changes occurred in the
American Methodist and (to a somewhat lesser extent) Catholic
churches.18 Professor Esbeck recounts how these religious traits
coincided with many of the new country’s political preferences and

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

1622

Id. at 1451 n.224.
Id. at 1393 n.20.
Id. at 1547–51.
Id. at 1559–61 & nn.634–38.
Id. at 1561–62.
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attributes.19 Religious themes therefore dovetailed with the
individualistic political themes in the writings of John Locke, as well
as with those of Jefferson, Madison, and other American secular
political elites.20
The second consistent theme running through Professor
Esbeck’s account is related to the first. The notions of voluntarism
and individualism that characterized the American religious culture
around the time of the Revolution were accompanied by an
antiauthoritarian spirit that viewed all hierarchies and authoritarian
structures as suspicious and even antithetical to the emerging
American ethos.21 In part, this was a natural outgrowth from the
political opposition to the country’s British overlords; more
generally, it was also part of a recurrent American resistance to any
centralized authority—either political or religious. This helps explain
the joint action of religious dissenters and secularist liberals in
opposing proposed state and federal religious establishments, but it
also has implications for determining the broader meaning of the
legal term “establishment of religion.” The clearest implication of
this antiauthoritarianism is that any attempt to assert the
preeminence of God’s will over secular legislation cuts against one of
the deepest grains in the American character. Professor Esbeck
correctly notes that modern proposals to erect state-sponsored Ten
Commandments displays are contrary to this antiestablishment trait:
“We should expect these arguments to lose, and for the most part
they do.”22
In contrast to the complementary and liberty-enhancing themes
of individualism and antiauthoritarianism, there is a third theme in
Professor Esbeck’s account that reveals a darker trend in the
country’s early religious and political history. This third theme is the
persistent favoritism of Protestant Christianity. Even as states
embraced disestablishment values, their actions often continued to
favor Protestantism. Examples of this tendency span the country.
Despite North Carolina’s abandonment of its Anglican establishment

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 1564–66.
Id.
See id. at 1456 & n.239.
Id. at 1583.
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in 1776, it still had a “decidedly Protestant” general establishment.23
New Hampshire finally abandoned its religious tax by adopting the
Toleration Act in 1819, but “maintained the conception that New
Hampshire was a Christian—in fact a Protestant—commonwealth.”24
As Professor Esbeck notes, even though the culture of the
Revolutionary era was clearly more accommodating to dissenting
Protestants, it still exhibited persistent hostility toward nonProtestants and especially Catholics, Jews, and nonbelievers.25 Even
the rare state of Vermont, which eventually broadened its religious
tax laws to include Catholics, continued to exclude from the benefits
of these laws Deists, Jews, and Universalists.26 The stark reality was
that “[o]nly one of the thirteen states [Rhode Island] under the
Articles of Confederation afforded equal rights to all non-Protestants
with respect to the practice of religion.”27 Modern paeans to
religious ecumenicalism notwithstanding, this country has a long and
sordid history of viewing some faiths as “more equal” than others. At
best, as Justice Story would later write, “[t]he real object of the
[First] amendment was, not to countenance, much less to advance
Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity;
but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects . . . .”28
II. THE LESSONS OF HISTORY
The only incontestable statement that one can make about the
historical materials reviewed by Professor Esbeck is that the history
of religion in the early republic is varied and often contradictory.29
What other lessons can be drawn from Professor Esbeck’s account of
the various themes in the country’s early history? Professor Esbeck
draws three conclusions from his historical account.
First, Esbeck notes that the history of the American religious
experience is defined largely by the victory of voluntarism. He
concludes that separationism has a legitimate pedigree to the extent
23. Id. at 1483.
24. Id. at 1533–34 & n.539.
25. Id. at 1504 n.417.
26. Id. at 1527.
27. Id. at 1550.
28. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 728 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833).
29. Esbeck, supra note 5, at 1393.
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that it draws on this voluntarist tradition, but he also argues for a
particular kind of separationism—one that protects individual
conscience but is at the same time intended primarily to protect the
independent prerogatives of the church. Under this version of
separationism, the government remains amenable to “moral values
based on religion [that are welcome] in the marketplace of ideas and
in the formation of public policy and law.”30
The second general conclusion Professor Esbeck draws from his
historical account is that “American liberals” have been unfaithful to
the American religious settlement by “attempting to drive the
religious voice out of the public square.”31 According to Professor
Esbeck, examples of this phenomenon include restrictions on
religious speech in public buildings and schools.32 Esbeck argues that
the Supreme Court should respond to these actions by saying “once
and for all” that it is not possible to use Establishment Clause
concerns as a compelling interest to justify “overrid[ing] free speech
or free exercise rights.”33
Finally, the third lesson Professor Esbeck draws from history is
the idea that the Establishment Clause is primarily a structural
provision intended to impose a “one-way restraint” against
governmental intrusion into the realm of religious organizations.34
From Professor Esbeck’s perspective, therefore, the separation of
church and state is properly viewed as separation of the state from
the church, but not the other way around. “When separation of
church and state is taken to mean a socially or juridically enforced
separation of religious values from public affairs and governmental
policy formation, such separation has no antecedent in the early
American republic.”35
Some of Professor Esbeck’s conclusions are unexceptionable.
Certainly the need to protect individual religious conscience is a
logical outgrowth of the early religious disputes that led to the
voluntarist religious settlement. Likewise, the introduction of
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 1579–80.
Id. at 1584–85.
Id.
Id. at 1586.
Id. at 1389 n.9.
Id. at 1393 n.20.

1625

8GEY-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/15/2004 1:37 PM

[2004

religious ideas into the intellectual marketplace and the welcoming of
religious speakers into the public forum are equally laudable. Even
the structuralist interpretation of the Establishment Clause is not
problematic, at least if the theory is described at a fairly high level of
generality and not used as the basis for denying individuals the right
to enforce the protections of the Clause.36 But some of Professor
36. A structural interpretation of the Establishment Clause may cause procedural
enforcement problems in two respects. First, the Supreme Court has recently become reluctant
to infer private rights of action from structural legal provisions. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536
U.S. 273 (2002) (refusing to infer a private right of action from the federal Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (refusing to infer a
private right of action to enforce Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). Although these cases
involved statutes rather than constitutional provisions, they cast some doubt on older
precedents in which the Court expressed a willingness to infer individual rights from structural
constitutional provisions such as the Commerce Clause. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439
(1991) (inferring a private right of action from the Commerce Clause). In a possible indication
of things to come, the Court recently refused to extend the implied constitutional remedy
originally promulgated in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (allowing private suits for damages against federal agents who allegedly
violate a citizen’s constitutional rights), to suits against private actors who allegedly violate the
Constitution while operating under color of federal law. Correctional Serv’s Corp. v. Malesko,
534 U.S. 61 (2001). In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia underscored the Court’s more
restrictive modern view of implied rights of action:
Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers
to create causes of action—decreeing them to be “implied” by the mere existence of
a statutory or constitutional prohibition. As the Court points out, we have
abandoned that power to invent “implications” in the statutory field. There is even
greater reason to abandon it in the constitutional field, since an “implication”
imagined in the Constitution can presumably not even be repudiated by Congress.
Id. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations and internal cross-references omitted).
A second way in which Professor Esbeck’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause
may implicate the ability to enforce that clause is through the standing doctrine. An
overemphasis on the structural operation of the Establishment Clause, to the exclusion of the
individual rights implications of that clause, may lead the Court to consider all individual
efforts to enforce the provision as generalized grievances, which would fail to satisfy the Article
III cases and controversies requirement. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208 (1974) (holding that an attempt to enforce the Incompatibility Clause was a
generalized grievance); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (holding that an
attempt to enforce the constitutional requirement of a regular statement and account of
government expenditures was a generalized grievance). Although Establishment Clause
challenges involving the expenditure of government money for religious purposes may
circumvent the generalized grievance problem via the taxpayer standing mechanism, see Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), it is not always simple to identify the financing nexus that is a
necessary component of that standard, see, e.g., Alabama Freethought Ass’n v. Moore, 893 F.
Supp. 1522 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (denying taxpayer-standing status to plaintiffs who failed to
show that the government spent money purchasing or maintaining a Ten Commandments
plaque hanging in a state courtroom).
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Esbeck’s conclusions are more dubious, and his attempt to link these
conclusions with the country’s early religious history—and thereby
give them legitimacy and an added jurisprudential heft in modern
constitutional
debates—illustrates
how
treacherous
such
constitutional historicism can be.
My main reservations about Professor Esbeck’s conclusions
pertain to his contention that, based on the country’s early history, it
should be permissible for the government to use religion as the basis
for the formation of public policy and legal rules.37 It is one thing to
insist that religion should contribute to the marketplace of ideas
along with other perspectives; it is quite another to propose that
religion should be used by the government as the basis for public
policy decisions and the legal mandates that enforce those decisions
on everyone in society. The former proposition is the inevitable
consequence of a vibrant private sector in which a liberal society
encourages multiple religious allegiances to flourish. The latter
proposition is the first step toward crushing a healthy religious
pluralism under the boot of religious majoritarianism. Indeed,
Professor Esbeck’s support for both private-sector religious pluralism
and religiously motivated legislation illustrates the dangers of
attempting to draw modern constitutional conclusions from
historical experience. Here is one of Professor Esbeck’s conclusions
about the historical basis of religiously motivated politics:
[A] separation of religion-based values from government and
public affairs would have been received with wide disapprobation in
the new nation. This is because civic virtue, now to be formed in
the independent sectors of home, church, voluntary society, and
school, was still deemed essential for the orderly exercise of liberty
and acquisition of the self-discipline necessary to sustaining a
republic.38

This is probably a fair summary of the spirit prevailing at the time
of the founding. But the reasons the governing elite of the new
country believed religion was a necessary component of public affairs
are far more problematic in the modern era. The founders of the
country believed religion was an indispensable ingredient of
37. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 5, at 1393 n.20.
38. Id. at 1580.
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governance because they uniformly thought of the country as a
Protestant Christian nation. Whether or not they articulated the
implications of their views as clearly as Justice Story eventually did,39
those governing the early republic had an exclusionary view of the
link between religion and civic virtue. Religion—by which the
founders meant Protestant Christianity—contributed to the values
advanced by the government in part to ensure that the government
would not be infected by the values of other groups the founders
perceived as iniquitous. Those falling within the excluded category
would include several groups—Catholics, Jews, Muslims, rationalists,
and others—that now constitute a large and growing portion of the
modern country’s population. One cannot embrace the legitimacy of
a religiously based political regime without also explaining how to
overcome the exclusionary nature of that regime.40
It is unlikely that, in the modern world, an explanation can ever
be devised to work around the unacceptable consequences of
religiously based politics. In the far more pluralistic modern context,
citizens of the United States will never be able to coalesce around
one core set of faith-based political values. From a religious
perspective, we simply cannot agree—as the Framers probably
could—about which specific religious values should predominate, or
about which public values should follow from the chosen religious
perspective, or even about whether religion should play a direct role
in the public sphere.
At one point, Professor Esbeck argues that his structural
interpretation of the Establishment Clause is preferable to an
individual-rights model because Establishment Clause battles under
an individual-rights model inevitably dissolve into culture wars.41
Esbeck argues that battles over the Establishment Clause are
inevitably fractious because the “Establishment Clause . . . is often
portrayed as addressing ‘who’s in charge’—that is, the worldview
(religious and nonreligious) that holds the mantle of cultural
authority. Such culture wars are divisive.”42 The obvious response to
this assertion is that if we permit the government to enact and
39. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
40. See Steven G. Gey, Unity of the Graveyard and the Attack on Constitutional
Secularism, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1005.
41. Esbeck, supra note 5, at 1390 n.11.
42. Id.

1628

8GEY-FIN

1617]

11/15/2004 1:37 PM

More or Less Bunk

enforce religiously based public policy, culture wars become not only
inevitable but also more momentous.
This is because religion involves deep and uncompromising
beliefs about ultimate goods. In a country as diverse as the modern
United States, religious disputes will therefore inevitably involve
disputes over various groups’ mutually irreconcilable concepts of
ultimate goods. In the modern era, these disputes are likely to be
even more intense—because the range of religious variation is more
extreme—than the often-violent religious factionalism the Framers
experienced. If government policies can incorporate the religious
values of the political victors, then each group is likely to compete
even more vigorously to control the key apparatus for infusing the
culture with their vision of a proper society.
The only way around a potentially destructive war of competing
ultimates is to read the Establishment Clause as mandating a mode
of politics in which the reasons for political decisions are cast in a
form that are accessible to all and do not resort to exclusionary
articles of religious faith. Obviously, this is not a new or unique idea.
It is basically a claim that the government must abide by something
akin to the requirements of Rawlsian public reason—i.e., that
legislation should only be justified on terms that are perceived as
reasonable to people of diametrical worldviews and ultimate beliefs.43
This requirement can be incorporated into a structural view of the
operation of the Establishment Clause, but contrary to Professor
Esbeck’s claim,44 an interpretation of the First Amendment that
incorporates this view necessarily will grant individual citizens the
right to be free from state-imposed religion. Without such a right,
any structural protections offered by the Establishment Clause would
be substantively empty and impossible to enforce in any event.45

43. See JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in THE LAW OF PEOPLES
129, 131–32 (1999). The emphasis on regulating public rationales for legislation provides an
effective balance between the free exercise and free speech rights of politicians to believe what
they will in their private capacities and the Establishment Clause interest in protecting
nonsectarian governance over a pluralistic society.
44. See Esbeck, supra note 5, at 1388 (“Avoiding treatment of the Establishment Clause
as an individual right to be free from religion is important here.”).
45. See supra note 36.
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There is ample historical support for this reading of the
Establishment Clause. To cite only the most obvious examples, this
reading of the Clause is implicit in Jefferson’s notorious wall-ofseparation metaphor46 and in Madison’s elaborate comments in his
Memorial and Remonstrance on the inevitably corrupting effect
religious establishments have on both religion and government.47 On
the other hand, I also recognize that barring the government from
using religion as the basis for legislation and other forms of public
policy would have been an anathema to many of those living at the
time the Constitution was crafted. But we no longer have the luxury
of governing the country as if multiple waves of immigration and the
attendant explosion of different forms of religious belief (and
nonbelief) have not changed the face of the country the Framers
knew. With regard to our determination of what the Constitution
means today, the contradictory historical evidence is simply not
dispositive. The history of the Constitution will always contribute
depth and texture to discussions of constitutional theory and
application. But it is time to shift the focus of constitutional
discussions from the past to the present and to treat constitutional
interpretation in light of an active and vibrant religious reality rather
than a static and uniform religious history.
III. CONCLUSION
When all is said and done, the historical account of church and
state in the early republic leaves us right where we started: facing a
46. Thomas Jefferson, To Nehemiah Dodge and Others, A Committee of the Danbury
Baptist Association, in the State of Connecticut (1802), reprinted in THE PORTABLE THOMAS
JEFFERSON 303 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
47. Madison wrote:
During almost fifteen centuries, has the legal establishment of Christianity been on
trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride and indolence in the
Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity; in both, superstition, bigotry and
persecution . . . . What influence in fact have ecclesiastical establishments had on
Civil Society? In some instances they have been seen to erect a spiritual tyranny on
the ruins of the Civil authority; in many instances they have been seen upholding
the thrones of political tyranny; in no instance have they been seen the guardians of
the liberties of the people. Rulers who wished to subvert the public liberty, may have
found an established clergy convenient auxiliaries. A just Government, instituted to
secure & perpetuate, it needs them not.
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments ¶¶ 7–8 (1785),
reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67–68 (1947).
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complicated picture of a religiously diverse culture and the difficult
task of configuring for ourselves a constitutional regime in which
religion and religious organizations can flourish but not oppress.
However, an honest fealty to history will yield an Establishment
Clause that no religiously pluralistic modern democracy would want
or accept. If the concept of establishment means nothing more than
the prohibition of establishing any particular branch of
Protestantism, then we may as well not have an Establishment Clause
at all. We are not, as most of the Framers probably believed, a
Protestant nation. Nor, for that matter, are we a Christian nation,
nor even a uniformly religious nation. In this diverse political
atmosphere, allegiance to religious ideals or religious institutions is
not a logically necessary component of virtuous political governance,
even if most of our forefathers believed it to be so.
None of this is intended to suggest that the history studiously
recounted by Professor Esbeck is irrelevant to the determination of
what the religion clauses mean. The point here is that the history
must be kept in perspective. History frames the discussion about
constitutional meaning and provides a context in which the various
dimensions of constitutional questions can be viewed in sharp relief.
History provokes us to ask the right questions, but it will never give
us all the right answers.
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